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Every waking moment should be governed by the laws of the Torah. Every action must accord
with Torah principles. Torah law dictates which shoe one should put on first.1 There are
also various laws relating to the bathroom.2 The Torah also teaches not only that one must
pray three times a day, but also that the three prayers must each be recited during their respective
specific time periods, as laid out by Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.3 With this in mind, it should
come as no surprise that the Torah regulates what a Jew may eat and drink.
Upon completing one of its renditions of the Jewish dietary laws, the Torah states that Jews
have an obligation ‘‘to distinguish,’’ or ‘‘l’havdil’’ (in the original Hebrew) ‘‘between the
contaminated and the pure, and between the animal that may eaten and the animal that may not
be eaten.’’4 Rashi5 explains that the obligation goes beyond merely reading through the Torah
passages that discuss these laws; rather one must learn the laws until he knows them, recognizes
them, and is an expert in them.6 It is with this in mind that I now begin to scratch the surface
of the Jewish dietary laws.
1Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 2:4. One should put on his right shoe without tying it, then put on his left shoe and tie
it, and only then tie the right shoe. The reasons for this order are spelled out in Mishnah Berurah commentary to Shulchan
Aruch.
Rav Yosef Karo wrote the Shulchan Aruch (a compilation of practical Jewish law that is still heavily relied upon), the Beis
Yosef (a commentary on the Tur Shulchan Aruch, which was a compilation of practical Jewish law that predated the Shulchan
Aruch), and the Kesef Mishnah (a commentary on Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, which was a compilation of all Jewish law);
Israel, 1488-1575.
Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan, also known as the Chafetz Chaim, lived in Poland, 1839-1933. His commentary Mishnah Berurah
on the Shulchan Aruch is a notebook containing many relevant opinions regarding innumerable Jewish law issues.
2Chapter 3 of Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim is entirely devoted to appropriate bathroom behavior.
3Talmud Bavli (the Babylonian Talmud), Tractate Berachos 26b.
4Leviticus 11:47.
5Rabbi Solomon Yitzchaki (ben Isaac, son of Isaac); born in Troyes, France in 1040, died in Worms, Germany in 1105.
6Rashi in his commentary on Leviticus 11:47.
1What does “kosher” mean?
The word ‘‘kosher’’ means ‘‘to be right, pleasing, [or] fit.’’7 Kashrus, then, is the study
or determination of what is and what is not kosher. (Some substitute the word kashrus with
its alternative spelling ‘‘kashruth.’’) The Torah states which foods are ‘‘fit’’ for eating
by a Jew in three different chapters. Specifically, for example, the Torah states that fish
are only kosher if they have fins and scales.8 The requirements for fish and for other animals,
which will be laid out below, spark an obvious question. Why keep kosher? What is the reason
behind the seemingly inane laws? Many laymen, both Jews and non-Jews, think that the source
of the laws of kashrus relate to nutritional and health concerns dating back to the revelation
on Mount Sinai in the year 1273 B.C.E. Most orthodox Jews, though, look to the supposed effect
that non-kosher food has on one’s spiritual being as the reason to keep kosher. The truth
is that both theories have proponents of great historical stature as Jewish law authorities.
What is the purpose of the Jewish dietary laws?
Rabbi Aharon Halevi9 (RA’’AH), who expounds extensively on each of the 613 commandments in
his book, Sefer Hachinuch, describes the essence of the kashrus laws in terms of their positive
effects on the physical health of the human body. He states, though, that he will not attempt
7Marcus Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Yerushalmi and Midrashic Literature, p.677.
8Leviticus 11:9-10: “This may you eat from everything that is in the water: everything that has ﬁns and scales in the water,
in the seas, and in the streams, those may you eat, And everything that does not have ﬁns and scales in the seas and in the
streams – from all that teems in the water, and from all living creatures in the water – they are an abomination to you.”
9Rabbi Aharon Halevi (c.1215-1293), also known as RA”AH, was born in Gerona, Spain and died in Provence, France.
2to explain any connections between specific dietary commandments and their actual effect on
the human body. He bases this refusal on a fear that if humans were told the connections,
then they might reject one of these commandments if the science of the day rejects the supposed
connection. RA’’AH explains that if the science of any time period leads to the conclusion
that any of these dietary laws has no effect on physical health, this will only be the case
because the scientists lack information on some critical factor. G-d, on the other hand, has
perfect information, so He recognizes health effects that scientists may never comprehend.
Even RA’’AH, though, concedes that emphasis is placed on protecting the human body only because
the physical body is the vessel that houses one’s spiritual being.10 While Maimonides11 doesn’t
state his opinion on the reason to keep kosher, he, too, explains that it is important to protect
one’s physical health at all times, because one’s mind is only free to delve into Torah study
if he is free from physical ailments and distractions.12
On the other hand, Nachmanides13 sees spiritual health, the health of one’s soul, as the reason
for the dietary laws. He notes that when the Torah begins its discussion of prohibited food
consumption, it introduces the relevant law with the phrase, ‘‘And you [the children of Israel]
shall be holy people before Me.’’ Nachmanides explains that this statement introduces the
dietary laws because these laws are relevant to spirituality, not to physical health. He states
that ‘‘it should be acceptable for man to eat all that sustains him, and prohibited foods relate
only to purity of the soul.’’14 Similarly, Don Isaac Abarbanel15 writes that the essence of
kashrus laws speaks to spiritual health. He states that it is wrong to think of these laws
10Sefer Hachinuch, commandments 73 and 147.
11Rabbi Moses ben Maimom (Maimonides, Rambam); born in Cordova, Spain in 1138, died in Egypt in 1204. His major
philosophical work is called Moreh Nevuchim, and he compiled all of Jewish law into a treatise called Mishnah Torah (literally
meaning a review of the Torah).
12Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, Hilchos De’os 3:3, 4:1
13Rabbi Moses ben Nachman (Nachmanides, Ramban); born in Gerona, Spain in 1194, dies in Israel in 1270.
14Exodus 22:30 and Nachmanides’ commentary on that verse.
15Rabbi Don Isaac Abarbanel; Spain, 1437-1508.
3as prescriptions for good physical health because, he continues, this would place the Torah
‘‘at a level equal any other small treatise on medical health.’’ Rather, eating kosher prevents
non-kosher food from contaminating the soul.16
The distinction between kosher and non-kosher land animals
Despite the debate about the purpose of kashrus, all agree that Jews must eat only kosher foods.
So, I now turn to an analysis of some of the more basic kashrus laws. The first reference
to the distinction between kosher and non-kosher animals can be found in the story of Noah
and the great flood. G-d commanded Noah to bring with him onto the ark seven of every species
of kosher animal and two of every species of non-kosher animal.17 But how did Noah know which
animals were kosher and which were not kosher? The revelation at Sinai had not yet taken place!?
Did Noah know the laws of the Torah before the giving thereof? There are two most common answers
to this question. Some commentaries explain that Noah actually learned Torah before it was
received at Sinai.18 Noah is actually not the only person to have supposedly learned Torah
before the revelation at Sinai.19 How this is possible is explained by some commentaries but
16Abarbanel’s commentary on Leviticus 11:13.
17Genesis 7:1-3: “Then G-d said to Noah, ‘Come to the ark, you and all your household, for it is you that I have seen to be
righteous before Me in this generation. Of every clean animal taken unto you seven, a male with its mate, and of the animal
that is not clean, two, a male with its mate; of the birds of the heavens also, seven, male and female, to keep seed alive upon
the face of all the earth ...”’
18Rashi commentary on Genesis 7:2. Regarding the Torah’s reference to “every clean animal,” Rashi states, “Those animals
that, in the future, will be considered clean and kosher for the Jews. We see from here that Noah learned Torah.”
19Other examples of people who learned the Torah many years before the revelation at Sinai include Abraham and Jacob.
While discussing the story of Abraham circumcising himself and his son Yishmael, Sifsei Chachamim (Rabbi Shabsai Bass,
1641-1718), the most widely used commentary on Rashi’s commentary on the Torah, writes that Abraham fulﬁlled all of the
laws of the Torah. Additionally, the Talmud in Tractate Megillah 17a explains that Jacob suﬀered 22 years of anguish when
he did not know that his son Joseph was indeed alive in Egypt. The Talmud explains that the 22 years were a punishment,
measure for measure, for the 22 years that Jacob lived with Laban. Just as Jacob didn’t serve and honor his father, Isaac, for
4is beyond the scope of this essay. The basic law with meat animals is that they are kosher
only if they both chew their cud and have split hooves. The Torah also enumerates animals
that have only one of these characteristics but not the other one.20 In fact, the way in which
the Torah explains this issue sheds some light on why everyone (i.e. religious Jews, non-religious
Jews, and non-Jews) seems to know that Jews are prohibited from eating pork. The pig is the
only animal listed as having split hooves but not chewing its cud.21 Some commentaries explain
that the pig tries to show its hooves so that Jews will incorrectly eat it. The split hooves
are readily visible whereas the pig’s lack of a double stomach is not externally visible. Consequently,
the Torah explicitly enumerated the pig as its own class of non-kosher animal.22 Perhaps this
explicit reference created the worldwide awareness. Of course it is also possible that the
universal knowledge of the pork prohibition is due to the simple fact that pork is a very popular
food; thus, the rejection thereof by Jews has occurred often enough to strengthen knowledge
of its prohibited status. While the Torah provides the two guidelines for kosher land animals,
this does not mean that a Jew can eat any food that conforms to these two regulations. As
will be elaborated below, there are a host of other issues that can arise that will bring even
these meats into the prohibited group.
Poultry
22 years, so too Joseph did not serve and honor his father, Jacob, for 22 years. Based on many verses in the Torah, the Talmud
concludes, though, that Jacob had in fact not been with his father for 36 years. The Talmud explains the apparent discrepancy
by saying that Jacob was not punished for 14 of the 36 years because for those 14 years he studied Torah in the house of Shem
and Ever. Thus, we see that both Abraham and Jacob studied Torah hundreds of years before the revelation at Sinai.
20Leviticus 11:4-8, Deuteronomy 14:7,8. The text in Leviticus states, “But this is what you shall not eat from among those
that bring up their cud or that have split hooves: the camel, for it brings up its cud, but its hoof is not split – it is unclean to
you; and the hyrax, for it brings up its cud, but its hoof is not split – it is unclean to you; and the hare, for it brings up its
cud, but its hoof is not split – it is unclean to you; and the pig, for its hoof is split and its hoof is completely separated, but it
does not chew its cud – is unclean to you. You shall not eat of their ﬂesh nor shall you touch their carcass – they are unclean
to you.”
21Id.
22Midrash Rabbah on Leviticus, Parshas Shemini, 13:5.
5When it comes to poultry/birds, the Torah does not state guidelines for the determination of
which are kosher. Instead, the Torah writes a list of all the kosher birds and a list of the
non-kosher ones.23 This method, though, naturally can hinder the determination of which birds
are kosher. One only knows what not to eat if he knows exactly which 24 birds the Torah prohibits.
While this may seem like a job for any child who can read, one must remember that the Torah
was written in Hebrew more than 2500 years ago. Thus, the exact translations of each of the
prohibited birds can only be based on tradition. Consequently, there is some debate regarding
which birds are kosher and which are not. Rabbi Binyomin Forst summarizes kashrus law as it
relates to birds:
‘‘All variations of the common chicken are accepted as
kosher. Similarly, common domestic ducks, geese, and doves
are considered kosher. Many Sefardic [Jews descendant
from Spain, North Africa, and the Middle East] communities
have a tradition that the quail is a kosher fowl. With
the appearance of turkeys, rabbinic authorities questioned
whether a reliable tradition exists about their kashrus.
Common custom today accepts turkeys as kosher fowl. There
is no definitive tradition about the status of a pheasant,
peacock, guinea hen, partridge, swan, or certain species
of wild ducks, geese, pigeons and doves; therefore, they
should not be eaten. The eggs of any non-kosher fowl are
also forbidden to be eaten.’’24
Ever min hachai – No taking limbs from living animals
23Leviticus 11:13-19, Deuteronomy 14:12-18. The text in Leviticus states, “These shall you abominate from among the birds,
they may not be eaten – they are an abomination: the nesher, the peres, the ozniah; the daah and the ayah according to its
kind; every orev according to its kind; the bas hayaanah, the tachmos, the shachaf, and the netz according to its kind; the
kos, the shalach, and the yanshuf; the tinshemes, the kaas, and the racham; the chasidah, the anafah according to its kind, the
duchifas, and the atalef.”
6Above, I mentioned that Noah distinguished between kosher and non-kosher animals when bringing
the animals into the ark. Noah did this despite the fact that the Torah was not given yet
and despite the fact that was not obligated to keep kosher (nor is there any evidence that
he did). Interestingly, though, he was eventually commanded regarding one food matter. Jews
believe that even before the giving of the Torah, all of the people of the world were obligated
in the seven Noahide laws.25 That is, after the great flood, when G-d promised that he would
never destroy the planet again, he also commanded Noah and his sons, and all future generations,
to conform to seven commandments. One of those commandments was a prohibition against eating
‘‘ever min hachai,’’ translated as ‘‘a limb that was taken from a living animal.’’26 Jews,
thus, continue to refrain from eating this type of food. Additionally, Jews should not provide
this type of food to non-Jews. This law can be traced to the Biblical command, ‘‘Before a
blind person, thou shalt not place a stumbling block.’’27 This verse has general application
to situations in which one’s action might cause another to violate a Torah commandment. Therefore,
a Jew should not give any limbs originally taken from a living animal to other Jews or to non-Jews.
Of course, this means that a Jew should also not cause a fellow Jew to eat any non-kosher food.
25Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sanhedrin 56a: All sons of Noah (i.e. all people) are commanded regarding seven commandments.
The following are the seven Noahide laws:
1) Dinin – This Aramaic word refers to the requirement incumbent on every society to set up a law code and a court
system.
2) Bircas Hashem – These words literally translate to “blessing G-d.” While one might think that this refers to a command-
ment to bless G-d, it actually is a commandment to not curse G-d. It is often the way of the Sages to avoid writing anything
negative next to a reference to G-d. Often the Sages will replace the word the word that has the negative connotation with its
opposite. So when describing the commandment to not curse G-d, the Sages wrote “blessing G-d.”
3) Avoda Zara – Idolatry is prohibited.
4) Gilui Arayos – The Torah enumerates certain close relatives whose nakedness man, both Jews and non-Jews, cannot
uncover. The full list can be found in Leviticus, Chapter 18.
5) Shﬁchus Damim – Murder is forbidden to all people.
6) Gezel – Non-Jews are included in the Torah’s prohibition of stealing.
7) Ever min hachai – One is not permitted to eat meat from an animal while the animal remains alive.
26Genesis 9:4.
27Leviticus 19:14: “You shall not curse the deaf, and you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear
your G-d – I am Hashem.”
7Gid hanashe – the sciatic nerve
Another lesser-known law, even to orthodox Jews, relates to the prohibition against eating
the ‘‘gid hanashe,’’ which most contemporary rabbis understand to be the sciatic nerve. While
many orthodox Jews don’t actively think about this prohibition, this does not mean that they
violate it. As will be explained below (on page 58), orthodox Jews generally buy food only
if it has an approved symbol of kashrus, which can be granted by a rabbi who attests that the
relevant food was prepared in total accordance with Jewish law. Thus, Jews can keep kosher
without knowing all of the required kashrus laws. The basis for not eating the sciatic nerve
dates back to Biblical times. The Torah states that Jacob fought with an angel of G-d, and,
in the course of the fighting, the angel struck Jacob in the thigh, at the site of the ‘‘gid
hanashe.’’ The succeeding verses state that G-d then caused the sun to shine brightly on Jacob,
and G-d alleviated Jacob’s pain through the sun.28 RA’’AH, in the aforementioned Sefer Hachinuch,
explains that just as G-d eased the pain that Jacob had in his ‘‘gid hanashe,’’ so, too, will
He ease the Jews’ pain when their enemies harm them at any point in the future. RA’’AH continues
that in order to remind the Jews of G-d’s eternal kindness in this realm, Jews are commanded
to refrain from eating the ‘‘gid hanashe.’’29
28Genesis 32:25-33: “...he struck the socket of [Jacob’s] hip; so Jacob’s hip-socket was dislocated as he wrestled with him
...The sun rose for him as he passed Penuel and he was limping on his hip. Therefore the children of Israel are not to eat the
displaced sinew on the hip-socket to this day, because he struck Jacob’s hip-socket on the displaced sinew.”
29Sefer Hachinuch, commandment 3.
8Shechitah – the slaughter of animals according to Jewish law
While the rules relating to land animals and fowl are extensive, they are certainly manageable.
Does this mean that one can eat any meat from any land animal or fowl if the animal has split
hooves and chews its cud and as long as the eater refrains from eating the ‘‘gid hanashe’’
and limbs from living animals? Of course not. Jewish dietary laws are still more difficult.
The animal must be killed in a specific manner in order to be kosher. The killing process
is known in Hebrew as ‘‘shechitah.’’ The animal must be killed by having its neck cut in a
specific area. The fatal cut must be made using a perfectly smooth blade. Actually, there
are five possible ways for the ‘‘shechitah’’ to be invalidated.30 If the animal is not killed
‘‘correctly,’’ then the animal is not kosher, and Jews may not eat it. The carcass of an animal
that was not slaughtered according to the ritual rules is called a ‘‘neveilah’’ and may not
be consumed. Likewise, even an animal that died naturally is a ‘‘neveilah.’’31 Neither of
these carcasses resulted from a perfect ‘‘shechitah.’’
Before leaving the discussion of ‘‘shechitah,’’ it is important to take note of Rabbi Forst’s
reaction to some people’s concern about the alleged inhumanity of the ‘‘shechitah’’ killing:
30Rabbi Binyomin Forst desribes the ﬁve invalidations on p.36, footnote 24, of The Laws of Kashrus: “There are ﬁve ba-
sic disqualiﬁcations of shechitah: 1) Shehiyah (hesitation): the shechitah must be performed in one continuous act without
hesitation. 2) Chaladah (a covered knife): the shechitah knife may not be covered with skin, feathers, wool, or cloth during
the shechitah. 3) D’rasah (pressing): the shechitah must be accomplished by the sharpness of the knife. Any undue pressure
applied to the knife invalidates the shechitah. 4) Hagramah (cutting outside of the prescribed area): if the knife cuts beyond
that area, the shechitah is invalid. 5) Ikur (uprooting): if the trachea and esophagus are uprooted from their place in the
animal’s neck before comletion of the shechitah, the shechitah is invalid.”
31Jastrow Dictionary p.870.
9‘‘Although it is not within the framework of this [book],
note should be taken of the controversy surrounding the
question of dulling the animal’s senses before shechitah.
It is our belief that the Torah proscribed the most humane
method for slaughtering an animal. It is from the Torah
itself that mankind derived the concept of avoiding tzaar
baalei chaim (inflicting pain upon living creatures). It is
thus peculiar that over the last hundred years many attempts,
successful and unsuccessful, were made to prohibit shechitah as
inhumane to animals ...In some of these countries, shechitah
was permitted providing the animal was stunned (either
electrically or through a blow to the head) beforehand.
Halachic authorities, however, were unanimous in their refusal
to permit shechitah under these circumstances. Several
reasons were cited: to require stunning of the animal would
constitute acknowledgment that shechitah itself is inhumane.
Acknowledgment of this untruth would constitute a grave chilul
Hashem32 (desecration of Divine honor). In addition, stunning
the animal may render it a treifah. [I will discuss the law
of treifah on page 17] See collected letters of Rabbi Chaim
Ozer Grodzinsky vol. II p. 732, Responsa Sridei Eish vol.
I.’’
The consumption of blood and salting kosher meat
Another rule states that Jews may not eat the blood of even a kosher animal or fowl.33 In
order to ensure that there will be no blood in kosher food, the meat of the properly slaughtered
animal must be heavily salted before it is cooked. The salt must be sufficient to soak up
all the blood. The salt must then be washed away before it (and the blood) redissolves into
the meat. The liver is so permeated with blood that only broiling can remove that blood. Fish
blood is permitted because it is conspicuously missing from the prohibiting verse.34 Even
fish blood, however, is prohibited if it is gathered in a vessel. This rule is a rabbinic
decree that was enacted in order to prevent confusion that would otherwise arise if one has
33Leviticus 19:26: “You shall not eat over the blood ...” The prohibition is repeated in other verses in the Torah, such as
Leviticus 7:26 and Leviticus 17:12.
34Leviticus 7:26: “You shall not consume any blood, in any of your dwelling places, whether from fowl or from animals.”
10many vessels filled with blood. In this case, he might forget which one has the kosher fish
blood and accidentally eat non-kosher blood. However, even fish blood that is gathered in
a vessel is permitted if it is recognizable as fish blood, for example if it contains fish
scales.35
Interestingly, the Torah does shed some light on the reason for the blood prohibition. The
Torah states, ’’For the soul of the flesh is in the blood; and I have assigned it for you upon
the altar to provide atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that atones for the soul.
Therefore I have said to the children of Israel, ‘Any person among you may not consume blood;
and the proselyte who dwells among you may not consume blood.’’’36 It would certainly be inappropriate
for one to consume that which atones for him.
Meat from animals with mortal wounds and glatt kosher
Finally, the Torah also dictates that Jews may not eat meat from a ‘‘treifah.’’37 The word
‘‘treifah’’ is defined as torn.38 In relation to animals, the word is used to describe ‘‘an
animal with any of a specific group of physical defects that are in the Talmud and the law
codes. Examples of these ‘‘defects,’’ which often go far beyond the health inspection of the
35Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 66:9.
36Leviticus 17:11-12.
37Exodus 22:30: “People of holiness shall you be to Me; you shall not eat ﬂesh of an animal that was torn in the ﬁeld; to the
dog shall you throw it.”
38Jastrow Dictionary pp.555-56.
11USDA, include certain lesions, lacerations, broken limbs, missing or punctured organs, or the
result of an attack by a larger animal.’’39 Thankfully, though, because most of these defects
are rare, it may be assumed that most animals are healthy.40 There is, therefore, no requirement
to inspect every animal for them. An exception is the lung of an animal, on which adhesions,
called ‘‘sirchot,’’ may develop. While these problems also cannot be considered common, their
relative prevalence led past Torah scholars to mandate that the lungs of every animal be examined,
both manually while still in its natural position in the animal, and visually following its
removal from the thoracic cavity.41
A hole in the lung renders the animal a ‘‘treifah.’’ Therefore, adhesions on the lung are
problematic, either because they indicate the presence of a perforation that has been insufficiently
sealed (Rashi) or because they can become loosened, thereby causing a hole to develop (Tosafot).42
According to the kosherline.com author of a glatt kosher article, in the U.S., lung adhesions
usually do not occur on fowl. So, this issue mainly affects only meat. Generally, if the
lungs of the animal are smooth, or in Yiddish ‘‘glatt,’’ then the animal is accepted as a non-treifah.
If the animal’s lungs are non-glatt, then the animal is assumed to not be ‘‘kosher.’’
The Ramah43 concludes his discussion of the various types of lung adhesions with a description
of a method of peeling and testing many types of adhesions, thereby resulting in many more
animals determined to be kosher.44 The Ramah himself, though, expressed some hesitations relating
39www.kosherline.com, anonymous article on glatt kosher.
40Id. quoting Shach commentary on Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 39:1.
41Id.
42Id.
43Rabbi Moses Isserles (Ramah); Cracow, Poland, 1530-1572.
44Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 39:13.
12to this leniency; however, because it had gained widespread acceptance and did have a firm
basis in Jewish law, he ruled that the leniency could be followed. Of course, though, only
an exceedingly G-d-fearing individual, an individual who will be intellectually honest regarding
the outcome of the adhesion tests, should do the peeling and testing. It is important to note
that the peeling and testing method is mentioned only by the Ramah, not by the Mechaber.45
Therefore, Sefardic Jews, who largely adopt their Jewish law perspective from the writings
of Rav Yosef Karo, are required to eat meat that has no adhesions whatsoever. As a result,
when one goes to a store that sells kosher meat, he will often find that some meat is sealed
in packaging that reads ‘‘Beis Yosef Shechitah,’’ indicating that the meat is acceptable even
to those who follow the Beis Yosef46, Rav Yosef Karo. For Ashkenazim, who usually follow the
Ramah, there is a tradition that a small, easily removable adhesion is defined as a lower class
of adhesion and that the presence of up to two such small, easily removable adhesions still
qualifies the animal as glatt. That is, the meat is referred to as glatt even though it is
not smooth. It should be noted that while the Ramah’s ruling creates meat that is, in theory,
truly non-glatt (not smooth), if the meat is inspected properly, it is accepted even by orthodox
Jews as 100% kosher and, again, it is called ‘‘glatt kosher.’’
The above explanation makes clear any reference to fish, dairy products, or chicken, as ‘‘glatt’’
would be a misuse of the term. Additionally, even when referring to meat, it is only a description
of the status of the lung, but makes no statement regarding the standards of other kashrus
aspects, such as the shechitah.
45Rav Yosef Karo is sometimes referred to as the Mechaber.
46See footnote 1.
13Interestingly, misconceptions about the term ‘‘glatt’’ are so widespread that the word has
been used on chicken, fish, and even vegetables. Sometimes the word is used in order to mislead
the unthinking, the ignorant, and the credulous. Often, though, the term is thrown in not
to mislead, but, instead, to imply that the product was produced under a higher kosher standard,
or under a more watchful eye.
Cheilev – prohibited fats
An additional prohibition that applies to land animals, albeit not to their meat, relates to
‘‘cheilev,’’ or fats. The fats on certain internal organs must be removed from kosher, properly
slaughtered cattle, sheep, or goats before the meat may be eaten. According to the Torah,
this prohibition applies only to commonly domesticated animals, not to fowl or wild animals.
Even of the commonly domesticated animals, the Torah further limits this prohibition to those
that are listed elsewhere in the Torah as animals that are, at various times, sacrificed to
G-d. Thus, the commandment only applies to the ‘‘cheilev’’ of cattle, sheep, and goats.47
As far removing these forbidden fats, Rabbi Forst writes: ‘‘Removal of the forbidden fats
is a difficult task and must be done by a skilled expert. This process is called nikur. Thus,
47Leviticus 7:23-25: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: Any fat of oxen, sheep, or goats – you shall not eat. The fat of
an animal that died and the fat of an animal that had been torn to death may be put to any use; but you shall not eat it. For
anyone who eats the fat of animal species from which one may bring a ﬁre-oﬀering to G-d – the soul that eats will be cut oﬀ
from its people.”
Also, see Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 7:1; Talmud Bavli, Mishnah Tractate Kerisus 2a; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh
Deah 64:1.
14it is not sufficient to merely obtain meat with a proper slaughtering supervision; one must
also determine that the butcher is a skilled, knowledgeable and G-d fearing individual who
does nikur under proper Rabbinical supervision.’’48
Milk products and the question of cholov yisrael
Dairy products can be eaten only if they are derived from kosher animals. Thus, for example,
cows’ milk and goats’ milk are kosher. The same is true of butter, cream cheese, ice cream,
and other products that are derived from the milk of kosher animals, albeit, of course, only
if no non-kosher product is included in the ingredients. But what does this mean for Jews
today? It might have been commonplace to milk one’s own cows hundreds of years ago. In fact,
even those who did not own cows or goats surely bought their milk from people they knew. Fewer
than 100 years ago, many orthodox Jews in Europe still lived in towns consisting of only their
relatives and orthodox friends, some of whom owned kosher milk-producing animals. Thus, acquiring
kosher milk and knowing the source of that milk was relatively easy. Today, on the other hand,
orthodox Jews live in almost every part of the globe. Furthermore, orthodox Jews no longer
live in small, rural areas. Clearly, though, even orthodox Jews who reside in New York City
do drink milk. That is, they drink milk even though they have not personally verified the
source of the milk.
Most mainstream orthodox Jews drink milk every day despite their personal lack of information
48Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.40.
15regarding the source of their milk. Some orthodox Jews, though, actually do know where their
milk comes from. As a safeguard for the prohibition against drinking milk from a non-kosher
animal, Jewish law dictates that one may only drink milk that has been ‘‘watched’’ by a Jew
from the time of milking straight through until the time of ingestion. Milk that has been
watched in this manner is known as ‘‘cholov yisrael,’’ literally the milk of an Israelite (a
Jew). The Sages enacted this rule because of their fear that kosher milk might be mixed with
non-kosher milk, unbeknownst to the eventual drinker.49 These rules go into extreme detail
regarding the required supervision of the milk. For example, the Shulchan Aruch states that
if a Jew is sitting outside of a building in which a non-Jew is milking a kosher animal, then
the milk is still kosher as long as the building has a window through which the Jew could theoretically
check to make sure that the non-Jew isn’t tainting the milk.50
But what about everyone else? Those who drink milk that is not labeled ‘‘cholov yisrael’’
rely on responsa from Rabbi Moshe Feinstein.51 Rabbi Feinstein wrote that government inspection
is a valid substitute for Jewish supervision. He reasons that something that a person is quite
certain has happened is considered by Jewish law as if it had indeed happened. He maintains
that something that is known is on the same level as that which is seen. Therefore, since
we are quite sure that dairy producers are fearful of government penalties if they adulterate
their product, it is considered as if a Jew actually watched the milking process. We can assume
that there is definitely no non-kosher milk in the mixture. That is, Rabbi Feinstein considers
the milk completely acceptable. This is because the United States government heavily regulates
food processing, and the threat of a possible fine or even a factory shutdown prevents adulteration
49Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 115.
50Id.
51Rav Moshe Feinstein was born in Europe in 1895. He settled in the United States in 1937. Before he died in 1986, he was
accepted as the foremost rabbinic authority in the world.
16of milk. Even Rabbi Feinstein, though, concluded his ruling with the following: ‘‘Yet, for
one who is a ‘spiritual’ person it is appropriate to be strict ...and I myself am strict in
this regard ...’’52 Rabbi Feinstein, though, was not the first to rely on government inspection
as a permissive factor for ‘‘cholov yisrael.’’ The Chazon Ish53 wrote that ‘‘...since there
is government supervision for milk to assure that non-kosher milk is not added, and [the producers]
are subject to punishment for falsification ...it is like the case [in the Gemara] of a Jew’s
(sic) sitting nearby, and if he were to get up he would see [and therefore we consider it equivalent
to his actually seeing] ...and Pri Chadash54 wrote that if non-kosher milk is more expensive,
then we ought to be lenient ...’’55
Fish
The next major food product is fish. The Torah permits only those fish that have fins and
scales; all other fish are prohibited.56 Fish that have very small scales are kosher as long
as the scales are visible to the naked eye, even if only under optimal conditions, such as
very strong sunlight. Fish that lose their scales upon being removed from the water are permitted.57
Likewise, fish that have no scales currently but will develop them in the future are permitted.
Of extreme practical significance is the fact that any fish that has scales certainly has fins.
Thus, if one finds a piece of fish that has scales, one may assume that it had fins as well,
52www.kosherline.com/articles/chalav yisrael.html contains Rabbi Alfred Cohen’s translation of Rabbi Feinstein’s ruling.
53Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz; 1878-1953, died in Israel.
54Rabbi Chizkiyah ben David da Silva; born in Leghorn, Italy in 1659; died in Jerusalem in 1698.
55www.kosherline.com/articles/chalav yisrael.html contains Rabbi Cohen’s translation of Chazon Ish’s ruling.
56Leviticus 11:9-10.
57Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 83:1.
17even though he does not see the fins.58
Grain products
The discussion of grains again touches on an area of Jewish law that the vast majority of even
orthodox Jews either does not adhere to or adheres to unknowingly. Torah law proscribes the
consumption of ‘‘chadash.’’ The word chadash, which means ‘‘new,’’ refers to new grains. The
Torah defines ‘‘new’’ in this context as any grain that took root after the sixteenth of Nissan59
until the following sixteenth of Nissan.60 The Torah prohibited one from eating new grains
until that year’s grains were, in a certain sense, redeemed by offering the first of the grains
to G-d in the Holy Temple. The message is clear: One must thank his provider before he can
receive any benefit from the provider. Today there is no Temple. Interestingly, though, the
commandment not to eat chadash still applies. While in Temple times grains became permitted
after the offering, today grains are permitted after the date on the Jewish calendar when the
offering was brought to the Temple.61 From some of the intricacies of the chadash laws62, one
can conclude that the commandment applies today, even though there is no Temple in which to
58Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.39, quoting Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 83:3.
59Nissan is the seventh month in the Jewish calendar. This calendar still exists today in the form arranged by Hillel II, who
was the nassi of the Sanhedrin at the time (the president of the Great Court), between the years 359 and 361.
60Leviticus 23:9-14: “G-d spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When you shall enter the
land that I give you and you reap its harvest, you shall bring an “omer” oﬀering from your ﬁrst harvest to the kohen (i.e. the
Jewish priest). He shall wave the “omer” before G-d to gain favor for you; on the morrow of the rest day (i.e. on the second
day of Passover, the sixteenth of Nissan) the kohen shall wave it ...You shall not eat bread or roasted kernels or plump kernels
until this very day, until you bring the oﬀering of your G-d; it is an eternal decree for your generations in all your dwelling
places.”
61Talmud Bavli, Mishnah Tractate Menachos 88a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 489:10 and Mishnah Berurah 489:45.
62For example, Rabbi Pinchas Kehati’s explanation of the Mishnah in Menachos 88a states that the fact that we don’t permit
chadash to be eaten from the moment the sun rises on the 16th is because of our worry that when 3rd Temple people might
still think they can eat chadash from the moment the sun rises; we want to ensure that everyone remembers how to perform
the mitzvah correctly.
18offer the grain offering of thanks, so that the Jews remember the procedure after the future
rebuilding of the Third Temple. There is a difference of opinion regarding the applicability
of the Biblical prohibition to grains grown outside of Israel. Consequently, there is much
controversy as to whether or not one must refrain from eating grain foods even outside of Israel.
Certainly, though, all agree that if one is sure that a food product was made from grains that
took root before the sixteenth of Nissan, then he is permitted to eat that food. Because there
is so much debate on the application of this commandment today, I will not attempt to state
a consensus opinion. One must consult his local, orthodox rabbi for a statement of how to
act today. Nonetheless, because this law applies currently in Israel according to many opinions,
and because some adhere to this law even outside of Israel, one can often find Hebrew writing
on kosher grain products that says ‘‘Pas Yashan,’’ meaning ‘‘old bread.’’ This marking indicates
that the grain product was produced from grains that took root before the previous sixteenth
of Nissan; that is, the marking indicates that the relevant product does not contain ‘‘chadash.’’
Fruits and vegetables and the consumption of insects
Generally, fruits and vegetables are kosher. Even many fruits and vegetables, though, require
a sort of koshering process before they can be eaten. Some fruits and vegetables require ‘‘bedikah,’’
checking or searching. These foods must be checked for ‘‘shratzim,’’ swarming insects. The
Torah prohibits Jews from eating any rodents, worms, amphibians, or creeping, swimming, or
flying insects.63 Jews are also forbidden to eat entire creatures, entire ‘‘beryah’’s. If
63The Torah lists the prohibitions against eating swimming, ﬂying, and creeping land insects in three diﬀerent sections:
1) Swimming insects - Leviticus 11:10-11: “And everything that does not have ﬁns and scales in the seas and in the
streams – from all that teems in the water, and from all living creatures in the water – they are an abomination to you. And
19one were to eat unchecked lettuce, it is quite possible that he will unintentionally also consume
an entire ant. Consequently, one who eats fruits or vegetables in which worms, ants, or mites
are commonly found should wash the produce thoroughly and must also examine the fruit carefully
before eating.64 As an aside, it is interesting to note that there is one type of insect that
is permitted. The Torah describes the features of certain species of locust that are permitted.65
Today, though, most Jews do not eat locust because most Jews reside in the vast majority of
communities that do not have a tradition as to which species are the permitted ones.66
Does this mean that vegetables or even any food must be checked with a microscope? Is a bacterium
that is invisible to the naked eye a prohibited ‘‘beryah,’’ or whole creature? Insects that
are visible only through a microscope are not prohibited.67
they shall remain abominated to you; you shall not eat of their ﬂesh and you shall abominate their carcass.”
2) Flying insects – Leviticus 11:23: “Every ﬂying teeming thing that has four legs – it is an abomination to you.” As
explained in the text, four species of locust are excluded from this prohibition.
3) Creeping insects – Leviticus 11:29-31,41-43: “These are the contaminated ones among the teeming animals that teem
upon the earth: the choled, the achbar, and the tzav according to its variety; the anakah, the koach, and the letaah; and the
chomet and the tinshemes. Only these are contaminated to you among all the teeming animals ...Every teeming creature that
teems upon the ground – it is an abomination, it shall not be eaten. Everything that creeps on its belly, and everything that
walks on four legs, up to those with numerous legs, among all the teeming things that teem upon the earth, you may not eat
them, for they are an abomination. Do not make yourselves abominable by means of any teeming thing; do not contaminate
yourselves through them lest you become contaminated through them.”
64Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 84:8.
65Leviticus 11:21; Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 85:1.
66Rashi’s commentary on Leviticus 11:21; Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 85.
67Responsa of Yechaveh Daas 6:47. Interestingly, Yechaveh Daas quotes Tiferes Yisrael’s discussion of Talmud Bavli, Tractate
Avodah Zarah regarding consistency in Jewish law in that just like the microscope is ignored, thus permitting tiny organisms to
be consumed, so too the microscope is ignored in that ﬁsh whose scales are only visible through a microscope are not considered
kosher.
Yechaveh Daas is Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, the foremost Jewish law authority in Israel today. Tiferes Yisrael is Rabbi Yisrael
Lipshutz, who lived in Danzig, Poland, 1782-1860.
In his responsa, Yoreh Deah II, chapter 146, Rabbi Moses Feinstein also wrote that insects that are invisible to the naked
eye are not prohibited.
20Required tithing of produce grown in Israel
Fruits and vegetables are further restricted in that Jews may not eat any produce grown in
Israel unless the required ‘‘terumos’’ and ‘‘maasros’’ were set aside.68 Any produce from
which these tithes were not removed are called ‘‘tevel.’’ The Biblical prohibition only applies
in Israel and the rabbinic extension of the prohibition only includes some lands that border
Israel. Thus, Jews in the United States, who can eat fruits and vegetables grown by either
Jews or non-Jews, are generally unaffected by this prohibition. However, if an American Jew
desires to eat fruits and vegetables from Israel or even juice derived from Israel’s far lands,
he must be sure that the tithes were properly removed. Interestingly, even in Israel it is
possible to eat from untithed produce. If a non-Jew owns land in Israel and grows fruits and
vegetables until they are completely ready for consumption, then there is no tithing requirement
on that produce.69 (Essentially, in order for this exemption to apply, the only step remaining
in the production process must be shipment of the food.)
Fruits from new trees
Additionally, one who plants a fruit tree, whether in Israel or outside of Israel, may not
68Maaser (plural maasros) is the name given to the percentage of one’s produce that he is obligated to give to a levi. Terumah
(plural terumos) refers to the portion that one is required to give to a kohen, a Jewish priest. The Torah obligated all levi’im
(levites) to do work that was required for the upkeep of the Tabernacle and, eventually, the Holy Temple. The kohanim (the
priests) actually performed the Temple services. Because neither of these groups was allotted a portion in the land of Israel, the
Torah commanded all Jews to provide them with a share of their crops in order to sustain them. (The kohanim also received
various other gifts.) The Torah did not state the amount that the kohanim are to receive, but the rabbis expounded that the
minimum portion is 1/60 of one’s crop, the maximum is 1/40, and 1/50 is an intermediate portion. (Mishnah Terumos 4:3)
The Torah states explicitly that levi’im are to receive 1/10 of one’s crop.
69Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Terumos 1:11.
21eat any produce of the first three years’ growth; nor may he benefit from the produce. One
who replants a tree may also be required to wait three years before eating any of the fruits.
For the first three years of the tree’s fruit production, the prohibited produce is called
‘‘orlah.’’70 In the fourth year, the food is called ‘‘netah r’vaei,’’ literally the plant
of the fourth [year]. The fourth year produce is also prohibited.71 However, unlike ‘‘orlah,’’
‘‘netah r’vaei’’ may be eaten (while still in the fourth year) if it is redeemed. During Temple
times, one was required to bring ‘‘netah r’vaei’’ to Jerusalem; only in Jerusalem could he
consume this food. If he did not want to carry the food to Jerusalem, he could redeem the
food for its full monetary value, bring the money to Jerusalem, and use the money to buy food
that would be eaten in Jerusalem. Today, the redemption process is quite different. After
gathering the fruit, one recites a special blessing for the redemption of fourth year produce.
He then verbally declares, ‘‘These [foods] are redeemed in exchange for this ‘perutah.’’’ One
should take note of the fact that while in Temple times the redemption required an exchange
of full monetary value, today a perutah (The perutah was a coin of trivial value. While it
functioned as a penny, being the coin of lowest denomination, it is more comparable to either
a dime or a quarter today) suffices. He then takes the ‘‘perutah’’ and throws it into the
Dead Sea.72
The explanation for the easier redemption process today, when there is no Temple, might be
that the original requirement related to the fact that because the food is holy even in the
fourth year, G-d wants Jews to eat it in the holy city of Jerusalem. Because of the destruction
70Leviticus 19:23: “When you shall come to the land and you shall plant any food tree, you shall treat its fruit as forbidden;
for three years they shall be forbidden to you, they shall not be eaten.”
71Leviticus 19:24-25: “In the fourth year, all its fruit shall be sanctiﬁed to laud Hashem. And in the ﬁfth year you may eat
its fruit – so that it will increase its crop to you – I am Hashem, your G-d.” This law is stated, as well, in Mishnah Torah,
Hilchos Netah R’vaei 9:1.
72Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 10:9-18.
22of the Temple, perhaps all of Jerusalem lost some of its holiness. Consequently, I propose,
because the process that truly relates the holy food to the holy city cannot be implemented,
today’s redemption process serves as a mere reminder of both the original redemption process
that cannot be performed and of all that was lost when the Temple was destroyed.
Amazingly, the laws of ‘‘orlah’’ apply even outside of Israel and even to trees owned by non-Jews.
Obviously, though, non-Jews whose lives are not guided by the Torah will not refrain from eating
the fruits of their trees for several years. The law must be directed to Jews. The Torah
is commanding Jews to treat all fruit of any tree’s first three/four years as holy, even if
the owner does not. Jews must not eat from these fruits. Does this mean that fruits require
kosher symbols indicating that they are from the fifth year of the tree’s production years
or that they are from the fourth year but have been properly redeemed? In fact, fruits do
not require any kosher symbols. An orthodox Jew violates no Jewish laws when he walks into
any fruit store in Cambridge and buys an apple. According to Rabbi Yaacov Baal Haturim73,
the reason for this is that cases of doubt must be decided harshly in instances of trees of
Israel, whereas cases of doubt are decided leniently for trees outside of Israel. At first
glance, this ruling is based on the idea of ‘‘s’feika d’oraisa l’chumrah, s’feika d’rabbanan
l’kula.’’ Literally, this means that cases of doubt regarding laws of the Torah must be decided
stringently, and cases of doubt regarding laws of rabbinic origin are decided leniently. This
idea applies to ‘‘orlah’’ in cases where one is not sure if the fruit in the supermarket is
from its tree’s first years of fruit or from its tree’s tenth year of fruit. That is, one
is not sure how many years the relevant tree has been bearing fruit. Also, I strongly discourage
73Rabbi Jacob ben Asher (son of Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel, the Rosh) also authored the Tur Shulchan Aruch (also referred
to simply as the Tur). He was born in Germany c.1270 and died c.1340 in Spain.
23trying to ask a supermarket clerk if he knows the exact tree that a specific apple came from,
let alone how many years that tree has been producing fruit. If we are required to rule stringently
in this case, we would not eat the questionably ‘‘orlah’’ fruit. So why do we treat cases
of doubt stringently in Israel but leniently outside of Israel? Regarding trees in Israel,
for which the ‘‘orlah’’ commandment is written explicitly in the Torah, we strictly prohibit
eating fruits of questionable status. Regarding trees outside of Israel, the Tur Shulchan
Aruch writes that cases of doubt are to be ruled leniently so that one may eat the questionable
fruits. At first glance, this implies that the law of ‘‘orlah’’ as applied outside of Israel
is only of rabbinic nature. In fact, though, the Tur explicitly writes in the previous sentence
that ‘‘orlah’’ applies outside of Israel as a ‘‘halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai,’’ as a law taught
to Moses on Mount Sinai. Generally, laws taught to Moses at Sinai are considered as genuine
Torah laws, albeit not explicitly stated in the Torah. If they are not considered Rabbinic
in nature and assuming ‘‘orlah’’ applies outside of Israel as a ‘‘halacha l’Moshe mi’Sinai,’’
then why have the Sages ruled that cases of doubt should be decided leniently outside of Israel?
Rav Yosef Karo explains this apparent inconsistency in his commentary on the Tur. He writes
that as part of His instructions to Moses, specifically regarding the commandment of ‘‘orlah’’
outside of Israel, G-d stated that cases of doubt should be decided leniently.74 Returning
to the American Jew buying fruit in Cambridge, we now understand why he can eat the fruit without
worrying about violating the ‘‘orlah’’ laws. Because he has no way to trace each and every
fruit back to its specific tree, and because he is outside of Israel, it is a case of doubt
that can be treated leniently.
74Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 294:8-10; Beis Yosef on Tur, Yoreh Deah 294:8-10; Perishah (Rabbi Yehoshua Falk
HaKohen Katz, c.1540-1614) in Yoreh Deah 294:20; Talmud Bavli, Tractate Kiddushin 37a.
24The sabbatical and jubilee years
Another group of laws that deal with produce grown in Israel are the laws of ‘‘shemittah’’
and ‘‘yovel.’’ The word ‘‘shemittah’’ is used in the Torah to refer to the seventh year in
a continuously repeating seven-year cycle. The seventh year is called the ‘‘shemittah’’ year
because the word ‘‘shemittah’’ comes from the root meaning to slip or to release.75 In this
context, the Torah uses the word in reference to a landowner’s temporary release or relinquishment
of the benefits of ownership of his property. The Torah states:
‘‘Hashem spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai saying: Speak to the
children of Israel and say to them, ‘When you come to the
land that I give you, the land shall observe a Sabbath rest
for Hashem. For six years you may sow your field and for six
years you may prune your vineyard; and you may gather in its
crop. But the seventh year shall be a complete rest for the
land, a Sabbath for Hashem; your field you shall not sow and
your vineyard you shall not prune. The aftergrowth of your
harvest you shall not reap and the grapes you had set aside
for yourself you shall not pick; it shall be a year of rest
for the land. The Sabbath produce of the land shall be yours
to eat, for you, for your slave, and for your maidservant;
and for your laborer and for your resident who dwell with
you. And for your animal and for the beast that is in your
land shall all its crop be to eat.’’’76
In this paragraph, G-d commands Jews to release their hold on their lands in every seventh year. In the
seventh year, these landowners will not starve. They are allowed to collect as much produce as they need to
sustain their households. They cannot, however, collect additional produce in the hope of selling whatever
their family does not consume. Instead, the owners must give everyone, from themselves to gentile laborers
to wild animals, equal access to the produce. The produce is to be used for food, but it may not be used
75Jastrow Dictionary pp.1594-95.
25for commerce.77 As far as where and when these laws apply, Maimonides writes, ‘‘The laws of
the seventh year apply only in the land of Israel as the verse states, ‘When you come into
the land that I give you etc.’ And these laws apply whether or not the Holy Temple is standing.’’78
The Rambam makes clear that the laws do apply even in our times, but he states that these laws
are limited to Israel. Kesef Mishnah79 explains that there is debate regarding whether ‘‘shemittah’’
applies today on a Biblical level or on only a rabbinic level.80 Most interestingly, Maimonides
actually writes that the Sages decreed that Jews cannot work the land in Suria during the seventh
year. Maimonides, himself, explains that the Sages were concerned that Jews who lacked the
faith that G-d would provide enough in the crop of the sixth year to cover the ‘‘shemittah’’
year might travel to Suria during the seventh year.81 The Sages enacted this decree in order
to quash this potential desire of observant Jews. Because of the ‘‘shemittah’’ laws, the food
situation for the seventh and eighth (i.e. the first year of the next cycle) years is affected.
There are two ways for one to feed his family, though, even during those years. On one hand,
the Torah itself states ‘‘I will ordain My blessing for you in the sixth year and it will yield
a crop sufficient for the three-year period. You will sow in the eighth year, but you will
eat from the old crop; until the ninth year, until the arrival of its crop, you will eat the
old.’’82 Thus, G-d will provide those abiding by the ‘‘shemittah’’ laws with sufficient produce
to feed their families. Another possible source of food is the produce of non-Jews. There
is no prohibition against a Jew buying the produce of a non-Jew during the ‘‘shemittah’’ year,
even if the non-Jew grew and harvested this produce in the land of Israel. The laws of ‘‘shemittah’’
77Rashi’s commentary on Leviticus 25:5.
78Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel (The Laws of the Sabbatical and Jubilee Years) 4:25.
79Rav Yosef Karo’s commentary on Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah.
80Kesef Mishnah to Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shmittah v’Yovel 4:25.
81Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel 4:27.
82Leviticus 25:21,22.
26do not apply to non-Jews residing in Israel.83
After seven seven-year cycles, there is a ‘‘yovel’’ year. The Torah lists special rules that
apply to the fiftieth year in what can now be called fifty-year cycles:
‘‘You shall count for yourself seven cycles of sabbatical
years, seven years seven times; the years of the seven cycles
of sabbatical years shall be for you forty-nine years. You
shall sound a broken blast on the shofar, in the seventh
month, on the tenth of the month; on the Day of Atonement
you shall sound the shofar throughout your land. You shall
sanctify the fiftieth year and proclaim freedom throughout
the land for all its inhabitants; it shall be the Jubilee
Year for you, each of you shall return to his ancestral
heritage and each of you shall return to his family. It
shall be a Jubilee year for you -- this fiftieth year -- you
shall not sow, you shall not harvest its aftergrowth and you
shall not pick what was set aside of it for yourself. For
it is a Jubilee Year, it shall be holy to you; from the field
you may eat its crop. In this Jubilee Year each of you shall
return to his ancestral heritage.’’84
Thus, assuming we are now in year 1, six years from now will be year 7, a ‘‘shemittah’’ year.
We will then have six regular years until year 14, which will be the second ‘‘shemittah’’ in
our fifty-year cycle. Years 21, 28, 35, 42, and 49 are also ‘‘shemittah’’ years. Year 50,
however, does not begin the next seven-year cycle. Instead, year 50 is the ‘‘yovel’’ year.
Year 51 begins both a new seven-year ‘‘shemittah’’ cycle and a new fifty-year ‘‘yovel’’ cycle.85
Any work that one is forbidden to perform on his land during the ‘‘shemittah’’ year is likewise
prohibited during the ‘‘yovel’’ year.86 Unlike ‘‘shemittah,’’ though, ‘‘yovel’’ does not apply
today. Jewish law authorities cite the words of the Torah as the source for the inapplicability
of ‘‘yovel’’ today.87 The verse in Leviticus 25:10 states, ‘‘You shall ...proclaim freedom
83Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel 4:29.
85Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel 10:7.
86Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel 10:15.
87Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Shemittah v’Yovel 10:8.
27throughout the land for all its inhabitants ...’’ The Sages had a tradition that this verse
teaches that ‘‘yovel’’ only applies when all of the tribes of Israel reside in the land according
to their tribes; ‘‘yovel’’ is moot as long as the tribes remain mixed together. Today, because
the vast majority of Jews do not know what tribe they descend from, they can’t reside in groups
arranged according to tribe and, consequently, ‘‘yovel’’ cannot apply today. Also, there is
no rabbinic decree to perform the ‘‘yovel’’ mandates today. ‘‘Yovel’’ can be distinguished
from ‘‘shemittah’’ as well in that the ‘‘yovel’’ laws must be adhered to even outside of Israel
when ‘‘yovel’’ does apply, whereas the ‘‘shemittah’’ laws apply only in Israel and Suria. The
Sages learned this rule from the words in Leviticus 25:10 where it is written, ‘‘it shall be
the Jubilee Year ...’’ The Sages derive from these words that the Jubilee Year, the ‘‘yovel’’
year shall be. The Torah states that the ‘‘yovel’’ year ‘‘shall be,’’ and the Torah states
no restrictions regarding time or place.88 We do, as previously stated, restrict the application
as to time because the tradition from Sinai was that a different verse restricted the time
of this commandment.
Food combinations: (1) milk and meat, and (2) in planting
There are two Biblical food prohibitions that deal with combinations of two or more foods.
These are ‘‘basar b’cholov’’ and ‘‘kilayim.’’ Although one is permitted to eat meat or milk
of kosher animals, a cooked combination of milk and meat is prohibited. In fact, one may not
even derive benefit from such a combination. The prohibition of ‘‘basar b’cholov,’’ or ‘‘meat
with milk,’’ is alluded to three times in the Torah.89 All three times the Torah relates the
88Id. at 10:8.
89The Torah states the prohibition in Exodus 23:19, Exodus 34:26, and Deuteronomy 14:21.
28commandment with the statement, ‘‘You shall not cook a kid in the milk of its mother.’’ At
first glance, the prohibition would seem to only apply to kids and to the milk of each respective
kid’s mother. Also, the prohibition is stated only in reference to cooking. Rashi explains
that the Torah states the verse three times in order to teach three different laws regarding
the milk and meat combination: 1) the prohibition of eating the combination; 2) the prohibition
of benefiting from the combination; and 3) the prohibition of cooking the combination.90 The
Tur writes that the prohibition is not limited to a kid as the word is used today, that is
to refer to a young goat.91 This opinion is taken from the Talmud, which takes note of the
fact that the Torah specifies the phrase ‘‘kid of the goats’’ when it refers to a young goat.92
Because the Torah uses the phrase ‘‘kid of goats’’ when referring to young goats, the Talmud
views the use of the word ‘‘kid’’ as a generic representative of all kosher animals.93 The
Tur also explains that the prohibition is not limited to an animal with its mother’s milk;
rather, Scripture spoke in common terms.’’ By this the Tur means that it is common that when
an animal that is killed is young, its mother is at her peak in milk production as the young
animal has likely been receiving nourishment from the mother’s milk. Because ‘‘milk of its
mother’’ was commonplace, the Torah used that as an example.94 The Talmud actually goes further
than this basic explanation. The Talmud explains that the Torah specifically used ‘‘milk of
its mother’’ in order to teach a series of a fortiari derivations regarding the laws of milk
in relation to its forbidden combination with milk.95 The Tur continues by stating that there
is a set of Rabbinic extensions of the prohibition to non-kosher animals, non-kosher animals’
90Rashi’s commentary on Exodus 23:19.
91Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 87:2.
92Genesis 38:20, 27:16.
93Talmud Bavli, Tractate Chullin, pp.113a-b.
94Perishah commentary on Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 87:2.
95Id. at 114a.
29milk, and fowl.96
The law of ‘‘kilayim’’ states that one may not plant vegetables or grains near one another:
this is called ‘‘kilaei zeraim.’’ The Torah commands, ‘‘You shall not plant your field with
mixed seed.’’97 One also may not plant any vegetable or grain near a grape vine: this is
called ‘‘kilaei hakerem.’’ This law is stated separately in the Torah, ‘‘You shall not sow
your field with a mixture, lest the growth of the seed that you plant and the produce of the
vineyard become forbidden.’’98 Nachmanides and RA’’AH both propose the same reason for this
mitzvah. They explain that G-d created the world in its complete form. G-d fashioned all
living creatures, man, animal, and all living organisms, so that they will sustain themselves
for all time, or for as long as G-d desires the existence of this world. This is alluded to
in the verses describing the creation of the world. The verses state that each organism was
created ‘‘according to its kind.’’99 If we mixed two species, we would in effect be declaring
that G-d didn’t create the world perfectly. We would be declaring that we think that we can
improve on G-d’s creation of the world.100 It is important to note that this commandment only
prohibits the mixtures stated in the Torah. For example, one is permitted to combine chemicals
in order to create medicines or cleaners. While the policy justification asserted by Nachmanides
might lead to the conclusion that one should not mix anything in nature, the Torah only prohibited
certain mixtures, those of animals and those of plants. Of course, one may question Nachmanides
as to why G-d created living organisms in their perfect, complete state whereas He didn’t create
96Tur Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 87:3.
97Leviticus 19:19. The verse actually discusses three types of forbidden mixtures: “You shall observe my decrees; you shall
not mate your animal into another species, you shall not plant your ﬁeld with mixed seed; and a garment that is a mixture of
combined ﬁbers shall not come upon you.”
98Deuteronomy 22:9.
99Genesis 1:12, 1:21, 1:24, 1:25.
100Nachmanides commentary to Leviticus 19:19; Sefer Hachinuch, commandments 244, 245.
30all of the necessary chemical compounds. Were Nachmanides alive today, he would likely respond
that the reason for this distinction is hidden from us. In fact, the reasons for many laws
of the Torah are beyond human comprehension.101
Bitul: nulliﬁcation of non-kosher food
Another fundamental issue that affects practical kashrus law is the potential for nullification
of forbidden foods. When non-kosher food becomes mixed into a larger amount of kosher food,
it is possible that a ‘‘bitul,’’ or nullification, process will be effected so that Jews can
consume some or all of the food mixture. Nullification of non-kosher foods takes place either
by ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ -- nullification in a simple majority - or by ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’ -- nullification
in a ratio of sixty to one. A discussion regarding the application of these two possibilities
follows.
Bitul b’rov: nulliﬁcation in a simple majority
Generally speaking, when two similar tasting foods become mixed, the non-kosher food may become
‘‘batel’’ (nullified) in a simple majority of kosher food. Actually, ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ is possible
101The quintessential example of a “chok,” translated as an unexplainable law, is the law of the “parah adumah,” the red
cow. If a man becomes impure through contact with a human carcass, he must undergo puriﬁcation through the red cow. The
seven-day process involves sprinkling the cow’s ashes on the impure person. After the process, the impure person is puriﬁed
and the kohen (i.e. a Jewish priest) who prepared the ashes becomes impure until nightfall. Why is it that the same ashes that
purify one person serve to contaminate another? Even King Solomon, who understood the meaning of every commandment,
did not understand the law of the red cow.
31even if the non-kosher food remains intact. For example, if one has four pieces of meat in
his refrigerator -- three kosher pieces and one non-kosher piece -- the non-kosher piece is
nullified by the kosher majority. In fact, ‘‘the foods need not even be mixed together or
even close to one another. Indeed, even three unrecognizable pieces of meat in three different
rooms or stories of a house are batel b’rov.’’102 Clearly, this means that one may eat a piece
of meat from the refrigerator. Does this mean, though, that he can eat all four pieces of
meat, whereby he will surely have consumed the meat that was originally non-kosher? In other
words, does the ‘‘bitul’’ process work to actually transform the status of the entire mixture
into kosher meat or does it only permit a Jew to play the odds? If some of the food remains
prohibited to him, what can he do with that food? The answers to these questions should become
clear as I flesh out how the ‘‘bitul’’ process actually works.
The Sages derived the idea of ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ from the Torah law that one must follow the majority
opinion in a court of law. The Torah states, ‘‘Do not be a follower of the majority for evil;
and do not respond to a grievance by yielding to the majority to pervert [the law].’’103 The
commentators explain that the Torah mandate to not follow the majority for evil implies a positive
commandment to follow the majority for good, that is to follow the majority opinion in a court
when the judges are ruling fairly.104 Just as a court verdict follows the majority opinion,
so too the status of the mixture follows that of the majority ingredient. It is important
to understand that while the application of this concept to food mixtures, which are obviously
102Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.53, footnote 8, quoting Mishbetzos Zahav 109:1 and Darcei Teshuvah 109:4. Mish-
betzos Zahav is Rabbi Yosef Teomim (also known as Pri Megadim) who lived in Lvov and then Frankfurt, 1727-1792. Darcei
Teshuvah is Rabbi Tzvi Shapira who lived in Munkatch, Hungary, 1850-1913.
103Exodus 23:2.
104Rashi’s commentary on Exodus 23:2.
32not the explicit subject of the Torah verse, seems all too convenient, the Sages would never
enact a law that causes Jews to violate the Torah. The Rabbis could not cause a violation
of Torah law simply because they want to save some money. That is, because the rules of ‘‘bitul’’
can cause someone to eat non-kosher food, the Sages must have promulgated this rule only because
they had a tradition that G-d desired kashrus law to include this notion. For an in-depth
analysis of the relationship between the concepts of following the majority in the courts and
following the majority in food mixtures, Rabbi Binyomin Forst directs the reader to Shaarei Yosher
3:4.105
Early scholars disagree about the underlying principle of ‘‘bitul b’rov.’’ Most authorities
believe that the idea is based on the simple probability that each piece of food, as it is
consumed, is one of the original kosher pieces. Others assert that ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ is based
on the unique principle by which the non-kosher food completely loses its identity and becomes
permitted matter. Rashba106 goes with the former understanding. Logically, one who uses the
former reasoning should probably prohibit the consumption of the entire mixture, because when
one eats the entire mixture he certainly has eaten what was originally known to be non-kosher
food. Yet Rashba permits the same person to eat even the last piece of the mixture.107 He
does, however, state that one should not eat the entire mixture at once (i.e. in one sitting).108
Eating the entire mixture at once would leave no alternative other than to assume that non-kosher
105Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.54, footnote 11.
106Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Aderet; born in Barcelona, Spain in 1235, died in 1310.
107Rabbi Forst cites Beis Yosef 109 citing Maharam (Rabbi Meir ben Baruch Halevi of Rothenburg, Germany. Rabbi Forst
states that Maharam lived in the years 1320-1390; however, Rabbi Mattis Kantor, in The Jewish Time Line Encyclopedia,
writes that Maharam lived in the years c.1215-1293.) as saying that there is a reason for one who is punctilious to avoid eating,
or even giving to another Jew, the last piece.
108This prohibition is Rabbinical, not Biblical.
33food is now being eaten.109 This is the position that is most accepted by Jewish law authorities.110
Some early scholars rule that one may eat the mixture only in the amount that excludes the
size of the original non-kosher food. Anyone else, even another Jew, can eat the excluded
piece.111 Although authorities on Jewish law rule according to Rashba, many state that one
should adhere to this view ex ante.112 Others rule even more stringently, requiring that one
of the pieces not be eaten by any Jew, but instead that piece should be discarded or sold to
a non-Jew.113 They reason that one may assume that this leftover piece was the prohibited piece
and they, consequently, rule that once this piece is set aside one may eat the remaining pieces
even at once. Authorities on Jewish law rule that while following this position is a meritorious
act, it is not a requirement.114 The fourth opinion is that of the Rosh115, who takes a radically
109At ﬁrst glance, it seems strange that Rahsba allows one to eat the entire mixture yet he prohibits one from eating the
entire mixture in one sitting. Can one fool G-d by waiting an hour before ﬁnishing the mixture?! Obviously not. Why, then,
can even the last piece be consumed as long as one eats it at a diﬀerent sitting? The author of this paper suggests a possible
reconciliation of the apparent discrepancy: While the Sages taught that we must follow the majority, even as this idea relates to
food, they lacked the power to permit one to perform an “act” that certainly violates a Torah precept. Using this framework,
let us assume that eating a meal is a complete “act.” Thus, eating a steak in ten bites is not ten distinct “acts,” but is, instead,
only one “act.” This idea is consistent with the requirement to recite a blessing before consuming any food. When one eats a
large steak, he recites the appropriate blessing before commencing his meal. This one blessing covers all of the pieces. He will
not say another blessing unless he has a “hesech hada’as,” a lapse in his mental intent. Thus, the laws of blessings view all
of the consumption in one sitting as only one act. If one eats an entire mixture of kosher and non-kosher food in one sitting,
he guarantees an “act” that violates kashrus law. When he breaks up the eating into two or more sittings, however, each
individual sitting, that is each individual “act,” likely involves no violation. For example, Joe has 10 hamburgers, nine of which
are kosher and one of which is not kosher. When he eats all 10 burgers in one sitting, there is a 100% chance that he has eaten
the non-kosher burger during this “act.” If he eats ﬁve burgers in each of two sittings, then there is a 50% (9/10 * 8/9 * 7/8
* 6/7 * 5/6) chance in each of the respective sittings that he will eat only kosher burgers. Thus, Rashba allows one to eat the
entire mixture only if he breaks up the consumption into two or more sittings.
110Rabbi Forst, explaining that this is the ﬁrst opinion cited in Yoreh Deah 109:1.
111The reason for why someone else may ﬁnish eating the mixture while one person cannot eat the entire mixture himself
might relate to the rationale proposed in footnote 109.
112Rabbi Forst, quoting Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah Ramah 109:1.
113Rav Yosef Karo writes that the Tur wrote that one need not discard one piece equal to the prohibited piece. Rav Karo
explains that the Tur does not usually state what one does not need to do. He continues, saying that the Tur was trying to be
explicit about his disagreement with Rashi’s opinion in Talmud Bavli Tractate Avodah Zarah 74a, where Rashi says that one
should throw one piece to the dogs.
114Rav Yosef Karo, in his composition Beis Yosef, brings an example of one who followed this stringent position. Instead
of saying that this person may have believed the stringent position to be the law, Rav Karo writes that perhaps this person
was a learned and pious man. The implication is clearly that Rav Karo might expect certain scrupulous people to accord with
the stringent position. Rav Karo must consider this meritorious for if he didn’t he would have stated his disapproval. In fact,
Jewish law texts are rife with instances where the rabbis disapprove of one following a stringent position, because they are
worried that some might do so because of sheer arrogance.
115Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel; born c.1250 in Germany, died in 1327 in Toledo, Spain.
34different and more lenient position regarding ‘‘bitul b’rov.’’ Rosh uses the latter understanding
of the underlying principle. He believes that ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ involves a transformation of
non-kosher food into actual kosher food, so that each individual piece is now 100% kosher,
having nothing to do with probabilities. He, therefore, allows one person to eat the entire
mixture, even in one sitting.116 Rosh’s opinion is generally not followed.
Although according to Torah law all prohibited foods that are mixed with similar tasting kosher
foods are subject to ‘‘bitul b’rov,’’ nullification in a mere majority, the Sages required
a greater ratio for certain prohibited foods when they are mixed with their own type of food.
‘‘Terumah,’’ ‘‘challah,’’ and ‘‘bikurim’’ require a ratio of one hundred parts permitted food
to one part of the ‘‘terumah,’’ ‘‘challah,’’ or ‘‘bikurim.’’117 Additionally, a part corresponding
to the original ‘‘terumah’’ etc. must be given to a kohen (i.e. a Jewish priest).118 ‘‘Orlah’’
and ’’kilaei hakerem’’ require a ratio of two hundred parts permitted food to one part prohibited
food.119
116Rosh commentary on Talmud Bavli, Tractate Chullin 7:37.
117“Terumah,” as explained earlier on page 29 (footnote 68), refers to the portion of produce that one is required to give to
a kohen. “Challah” refers to the portion of the dough that one is obligated to set aside for a kohen whenever he bakes bread.
Finally, “bikurim” are the ﬁrst of each type of seven fruits that one grows, which he is obligated to give to a kohen. The seven
fruits of which one is obligated to bring the ﬁrst to a kohen are wheat, barley, grapes, ﬁgs, pomegranates, olives, and dates.
118The reason that one must give a part to a kohen is because all Jewish priests, as a class, have a claim on the amount of
food that should have been given to them, whether or not the producer of the food is permitted to eat the food because of a
“bitul” process. While prohibited matter may become nulliﬁed through “bitul b’rov,” thus allowing a non-kohen to eat what
may have originally been “terumah,” monetary claims are not extinguished by the “bitul.” Were the non-kohen to use the
entire mixture himself, he would be liable for stealing. This point is important because if we did not recognize the speciﬁc
issue of the monetary claim, then we might assume that this rule proves that the Rosh’s theory for the underlying principle of
“bitul” must be incorrect. That is, if we assume, as the Rosh does, that the “bitul” process actually transforms the food into
permitted matter, then there is no reason for the requirement give any part of this new mixture to a kohen. The mixture is
now composed of only permitted matter. One might think that the fact that one is nevertheless required to give a part to a
kohen disproves the Rosh’s position. Once we see the Rambam’s explanation that the requirement to give to a kohen is only
because of a de facto monetary claim whenever food is grown, the Rosh’s position again becomes tenable. Mishnah Torah,
Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 15:13.
119Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 15:14.
35Bitul b’shishim: nulliﬁcation in a super-majority
Once the ‘‘bitul’’ idea is stated in the ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ context, the extra stringency of ‘‘bitul
b’shishim’’ is easily understood. ‘‘Bitul b’rov’’ applies only to mixtures in which the taste
of the non-kosher food is not noticeable. If it is noticeable, however, then we encounter
the problem of ‘‘ta’am k’ikar,’’ literally translated as ‘‘the taste is important.’’ This
idea means that if the taste of the non-kosher food is noticeable, then that taste is considered
as non-kosher food itself. Thus, even the kosher food (which has absorbed some of the non-kosher
taste) assumes the status of non-kosher food is Biblically prohibited. Consequently, mere
nullification of the food is insufficient. We need ‘‘bitul’’ of the non-kosher taste also;
we need ‘‘bitul b’shishim.’’
Biblically, ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’ is only required if the mixture has both of the following characteristics:
1) The kosher and non-kosher foods are dissimilar in taste. If they were similar in taste,
then ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ would suffice because we would not be able to distinguish the taste of
the non-kosher food from the taste of the kosher food. We would, thus, not face the problem
of ‘‘ta’am k’ikar.’’
2) The foods are solids that are blended or cooked together or the foods are liquids. On the
other hand, uncooked and unblended solids don’t impart taste to one another.
While Biblically the extra stringency of ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’ (as opposed to the more lenient
36rule of ‘‘bitul b’rov’’) is required if both of the aforementioned qualities exist, the Sages
extended the requirement of ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’ to cases that have either one of the two characteristics.
The Sages were concerned that one might confuse some of these laws and end up violating a Biblical
prohibition. However, uncooked (and unblended), similar tasting foods do not resemble the
Biblical case in any manner. Because there is no resemblance to the Biblical case, and there
is thus no chance of confusion, ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ suffices for uncooked, similar tasting solids.
As clear as the ‘‘bitul’’ rules should now be, they have yet another complication in that certain
prohibited foods cannot be nullified even if mixed with an enormously larger amount of kosher
food. There are three categories of such foods, the first being foods that cannot be nullified
due to the nature of their prohibition. ‘‘Bitul’’ only applies to food that is absolutely
prohibited. Thus, foods whose prohibitions will disappear at the close of a specified time
period and foods that are not prohibited, but whose consumption is merely restricted, cannot
be nullified. Likewise, some foods may not be subject to the laws of ‘‘bitul’’ because of
the severity of their prohibition.
A ‘‘davar sheyesh lo matirim,’’ a food that will in time become permitted, cannot be nullified
in a food of similar type. For example, ‘‘chadash’’ (described above on page 25) cannot become
‘‘batel’’ since it will eventually become permitted on the sixteenth of Nissan, or today on
the seventeenth of Nissan. It can, however, become ‘‘batel b’shishim’’ when mixed with food
of a different type.120 ‘‘Tevel’’ (discussed on page 29) is an example of a ‘‘davar sheyesh
lo matirim,’’ because the prohibition can be eliminated as soon as the required tithes are
120Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.62, footnote 43, citing Shach 102:3, 98:6 (Shach is Rabbi Shabsai HaKohen of Vilna,
1622-1663), explains that similarity of foods for these purposes is determined by name not by taste. This is diﬀerent from most
of the laws of “bitul” which determine similarity of foods based on taste.
37separated.121
Fruits of the ‘‘shemittah’’ year (discussed above on page 34) also cannot be nullified in any
amount of similar tasting food. This is due to the fact that they are essentially not prohibited;
their use and consumption are merely subject to certain restrictions. However, the can become
‘‘batel b’shishim’’ when mixed with non-similar foods.122
‘‘Chametz’’ also cannot be nullified.123 The Torah forbids Jews from eating leavened bread
products during the holiday of Passover.124 In fact, Jews are not even allowed to possess leavened
bread products, which the Torah calls ‘‘chametz,’’ in their possession during Passover. This
‘‘chametz’’ cannot become ‘‘batel’’ in any amount of permitted food, regardless of whether
the food is similar or dissimilar tasting. This stringency can be explained with two approaches.
Firstly, ‘‘chametz’’ is not forbidden forever; it becomes permitted after Passover.125 In this
sense, it is a ‘‘davar sheyesh lo matirim.’’ Secondly, the prohibition of ‘‘chametz’’ is unusually
severe in that the Torah punishes one who eats ‘‘chametz’’ during Passover with the punishment
of excision and the Torah even prohibits the mere possession of ‘‘chametz’’ during the holiday126,
whereas most prohibited foods can be possessed by Jews according to Torah law.
Foods that are excluded from the laws of nullification
121Mishnah Torah, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 15:6.
122Id. 15:8.
123Id. 15:9.
124Exodus 12:15: “For a seven-day period shall you eat matzos, but on the previous day you shall nullify the leaven from your
homes; for anyone who eats leavened food – that soul shall be cut oﬀ from Israel, from the ﬁrst day to the seventh day.”
125Id. 15:9.
126Exodus 12:19: “For seven days, leaven may not be found in your houses ...”
Exodus 13:7: “Matzos shall be eaten throughout the seven-day period; no chametz may be seen in your possession, nor may
leaven be seen in your possession in all your borders.”
38There are also certain foods that cannot be nullified because they are considered significant,
either in the size or the nature of the food. While Torah law allows nullification regardless
of a food’s prominence, some foods are rabbinically excluded from the laws of ‘‘bitul b’rov’’
and ‘‘bitul b’shishim.127 Rabbi Binyomin Forst, citing various early Jewish law authorities,
lists these types of foods: (1) ‘‘beriah’’ -- a complete creature such as an insect, a non-kosher
bird, or even a complete sciatic nerve (‘‘gid hanashe’’) or a complete limb torn from a living
animal (i.e. ‘‘ever min hachai’’); (2) ‘‘chatichah ha’r’uyah l’hiscabed’’ -- a piece of meat
of a size and condition fit to serve to one’s company; (3) ‘‘davar she’biminyan’’ -- an object
that is sold solely by unit, such as a whole egg of a non-kosher bird that became mixed into
other kosher eggs, since eggs are sold by unit (by the dozen); (4) ‘‘davar chashuv’’ -- certain
important or prominent types of foods.128
Rabbi Forst also lists situations where some non-kosher foods cannot be nullified because they
are somehow too noticeable: (1) If small slivers of non-kosher food fall into a majority of
kosher liquid, the entire mixture is prohibited. The non-kosher slivers are noticeable to
the touch and cannot be nullified even if they cannot be removed; (2) Whenever possible, the
non-kosher food must be removed. This qualification extends, for example, to instances where
non-kosher fat is mixed with kosher food. The non-kosher food cannot be nullified; instead,
one should cool the mixture, causing the fat to jell, and then separate the non-kosher fat
from the kosher food; (3) ‘‘chazusa’’ -- A non-kosher food that was added to a mixture in order
to give the mixture color cannot be nullified; and (4) ‘‘davar hama’amid’’ -- A non-kosher
food which jells or solidifies the food with which it comes into contact is not nullified in
the combination. As an example, Rabbi Forst cites the instance where cheese was curdled with
127Ramah (in his commentary Darchei Moshe) on the Tur Yoreh Deah 110:1, Mishnah Torah Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 16:9.
128Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, pp. 63-64.
39non-kosher rennet. Even though the amount of rennet used is minimal and its taste is unnoticeable,
the effect of the non-kosher rennet on the cheese is noticeable and prevents nullification.129
Subsequent adjustments to the bitul (nullification) ratio
Now that the parameters of the ‘‘bitul’’ process have been set, the ‘‘bitul’’ topic is rounded
out with two final topics: (1) subsequent adjustments to the ratio of kosher and non-kosher
foods and (2) intentional bitul. The issue of subsequent adjustments exists in two situations.
On one hand, what is the law when additional prohibited matter is added to a mixture in which
non-kosher food has already been nullified? Or in the reverse case, what happens when kosher
food falls into a mixture that originally lacked the requisite amount of kosher food to effect
the ‘‘bitul’’ process?
As far as the first situation, the answer should hinge on how we view the already nullified
non-kosher food. Do we view the originally nullified non-kosher food as non-existent because
it was nullified? Or maybe the already nullified non-kosher food was merely in a dormant state,
in that it was unable to affect the status of the original mixture because of its small amount?
If one takes the second approach, perhaps this already nullified food reawakens to combine
with the additional non-kosher food, thus raising the amount of kosher food now needed to effect
‘‘bitul.’’ The law is that if non-kosher food is added to a mixture after ‘‘bitul’’ has taken
effect, the original ‘‘bitul’’ must be reevaluated. The amount of kosher food must remain
enough to nullify the total amount of non-kosher food, the newly added and the original amounts
129Id., pp. 64-65.
40of non-kosher food. If there is not enough kosher food anymore, then the original nullification
is no longer effective. The reawakening of the original non-kosher food is called ‘‘chozer
v’neor,’’ literally meaning ‘‘returns reawakened.’’ This rule applies to cases of original
‘‘bitul b’rov’’ and to cases of original ‘‘bitul b’shishim.’’130
We now turn to the case of kosher food that is added to a mixture that originally lacked the
requisite amount of kosher food to effect nullification of the original non-kosher food. How
much additional kosher food is needed to effect ‘‘bitul’’ in the new mixture? Do we require
additional kosher food in an amount that, in combination with the original kosher food, will
nullify the non-kosher food? Or do we demand an even larger amount, an amount of additional
kosher food that, by itself, will nullify the entire original mixture (because the entire original
mixture was prohibited)? The answer to these questions begins with the prevailing opinion
that ‘‘efshar l’sochto asur’’ -- the non-kosher taste cannot be extracted from the kosher part
of the original mixture. Jewish law authorities have formed a consensus, as well, that in
meat and milk mixtures (‘‘basar b’cholov’’) the entire original mixture assumes the status
of a prohibited entity. This means that one would need additional kosher food in an amount
that qualifies to nullify the entire original mixture, not only the original non-kosher food.
This concept is known as ‘‘chatichah na’asais neveilah’’ -- the original piece (or here the
entire original mixture) becomes a prohibited entity that generates non-kosher taste of its
own. In other prohibited mixtures, Jews of Ashkenazic (These are Jews who are not Sephardic.
130Rabbi Forst cites this opinion as the opinion accepted by the majority of Jewish law authorities. As an interesting aside,
Rabbi Forst cites Taz 99:13 and Shach §20 as stating, however, that if the additional non-kosher food was of a diﬀerent type
than the original non-kosher food, the dissimilar tastes do not reinforce each other. (Taz is Rabbi David ben Shmuel Halevi,
1586-1667, who lived in Poland.) This means not only that the original “bitul” is still eﬀective, but also that each of these
non-kosher foods can be added to the volume of the kosher food when calculating the possibility of the nulliﬁcation of the other
non-kosher food.
41Ashkenazic Jews generally descend from Russia and Europe, although not from Spain.) descent
continue to hold by this more stringent position whereas Jews of Sephardic descent rule more
leniently. Sephardic Jews follow the opinion that in other prohibited mixtures (besides the
mixture of meat and milk), while the original mixture retains its prohibition, it can, nevertheless,
combine with any additional kosher food to nullify the original non-kosher taste.131
Intentional bitul: does it work?
The Sages have ruled emphatically on this matter: ‘‘Ain m’vatlin issur l’chatchilah’’ -- one
may not nullify foods ex ante.132 This rule applies equally to cases of intentionally adding
non-kosher products to mixtures in the ‘‘bitul b’rov’’ and ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’ realms and to
cases of intentionally adding more kosher food to a prohibited mixture in an effort to effect
either type of nullification.133 One who does intentionally cause the nullification of non-kosher
food may not eat any of the resulting mixture. There are some exceptions to this rule: (1)
One who intentionally nullified non-kosher food without realizing that it is forbidden to do
so may eat the resulting mixture; and (2) We noted above that while a piece of non-kosher food
can be nullified when mixed into similar tasting kosher food through a process called ‘‘bitul
b’rov,’’ we added that the resulting mixture cannot be cooked. When the mixture is cooked,
even a mixture of kosher and non-kosher solids can only be nullified through the more stringent
131The opinion followed by Sephardic Jews is that of Rav Yosef Karo in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 92:4. The tradition of
Ashkenazic Jews comes from the opinion of Ramah in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 92:4.
132Talmud Bavli, Tractate Beitzah 4b.
133Mishnah Torah Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 15:25. Maimonides writes that the prohibition against intentional nulliﬁcation
applies to Biblical prohibitions and not to rabbinic prohibitions. He continues, stating his opinion that the mixture that results
from intentional “bitul” is Biblically permissible for anyone to eat. However, the Sages enacted a ﬁne as a punishment for the
wrongdoer. The commentaries on Maimonides come to the conclusion that Maimonides would apply this ﬁne as a prohibition
of consumption of the resulting mixture by the wrongdoer and by anyone for whom the wrongdoer may have intended to make
the mixture. See Kesef Mishnah 15:25. Maimonides opinion is cited by Tur, Yoreh Deah 99:5, as are the opinions of Rashba
and Rosh.
42‘‘bitul b’shishim.’’ One may, however, add more kosher food to effect ‘‘bitul b’shishim’’
and subsequently cook the entire mixture.134
Conclusion of the Jewish dietary laws
The preceding discussion was truly only a survey of some of the most basic aspects of the Jewish
dietary laws. In reality, though, the laws go much further. One can study for a lifetime
and not master all of the laws. I have, thus, limited the scope of this exposition to the
kosher status of foods before they enter the Jewish kitchen, at which point many factors come
into play that might negate the kosher status of the food. For example, because of the separation
between not only non-kosher and kosher foods, but even milk and meat kosher foods, the Jew
must maintain at least two sets of cutlery, one for dairy food and one for meat food. Knowledge
of these laws is of paramount importance for anyone who prepares meals in the Jewish home or
in Jewish restaurants. In recognition of the fact that it is so difficult to master the kashrus
laws, most orthodox Jews only eat at restaurants that are under the ‘‘hashgacha’’ -- the watch
-- of a person or organization that is well versed in these laws. Kosher restaurants usually
have a certificate that attests to the fact that they are under the supervision of a specific
rabbi or rabbinical organization. Kosher food products also bear a kashrus symbol on the label
that represents a statement by the organization providing the symbol that the food item meets
that organization’s kashrus standards.
Can kashrus be regulated by the Unites States government?
134Rabbi Forst, The Laws of Kashrus, p.75, citing Yoreh Deah 99:5, 109:2.
43It should be clear by now that the laws of kashrus are beyond the scope of laymen. It is important
to remember, too, that I have barely scratched the surface of the laws in this paper. There
are thousands of pages of original Jewish law text on kashrus. It is, thus, hard to imagine
entrusting any one person or group, whether under federal or state auspices, with the power
to decide how Jews should rule in the many cases of rabbinic doubt regarding which of the early
Sages we should follow. Perhaps, then we can get away with having a regulatory board that
only allows one to hold his food out as ‘‘kosher’’ if the preparation of that food accords
with every stringent opinion on each and every small issue. This system might work theoretically;
however, it would not work in practice. It is possible that there are some people who follow
every stringent opinion, but according to Jewish law one is not required to abide by stringent
opinions if the rabbis agree that the ‘‘halacha,’’ the practical law, does not follow that
opinion. The vast majority -- and by this I mean the super-super-majority -- of orthodox Jews
do not accept every stringency of kashrus law. Thus, a regulatory scheme designed to rule
most stringently would be worthless. On the other extreme, the Unites States or each individual
state could have a law whereby one would not be allowed to hold his products out as ‘‘kosher’’
unless he follows all of the kashrus laws minimally according to their most lenient opinions.
However, this system would be impractical also because one can surely imagine that there is
at least one rabbi in every jurisdiction who takes a radically flippant attitude toward kashrus.
Because the proposed system would work based on the least common denominator (i.e. the standards
of this rabbi), the vast majority of those who try to keep kosher would not be able to rely
on the worth less ‘‘kosher’’ stamp. What we are left with then is a system somewhere in between
these two extremes. The remaining question, though, is how should a law regulating kashrus
be structured? Because of the quality of the case law surrounding it, I will examine the New
44York statutes that deal with labeling a food item as ‘‘kosher.’’
Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman
The New York statute parallels the relevant statutes of other states. These statutes have
recently come under fierce attack. Again, though, looking at the New York statute, the relevant
case law begins with Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 45 S.Ct. 141 (1925). In Hygrade,
several parties challenged the constitutionality of New York’s kosher food products law. They
alleged violations of the due process, equal protection, and commerce clauses. The specific
complaint was ‘‘that the word ‘kosher’ and the phrase ‘orthodox Hebrew religious requirements’
are so indefinite and uncertain as to cause the statutes to be unconstitutional for want of
any ascertainable standard of guilt.’’ Id. at 142. The Supreme Court, though, upheld the
statute stating that the intent to defraud requirement should preclude the alleged apprehensions:
‘‘The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, upholding the validity of a statute
substantially the same as those now under review, in People v. Atlas, 183 App.Div. 595, 596, 597, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 835,
thus characterized it: ‘The purpose of the statute manifestly, is to prevent and punish fraud
in the sale of meets [sic] or meat preparation, and it only operates on those who knowingly
violate its provisions, for it is expressly provided that there must be both an intent to defraud
and a false representation.’’’ Id. at 142. The Hygrade Court went on to cite other examples
in the law where one is expected to use some judgment in determining how others will perceive
his actions. In the statutes prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor and in the statutes
prohibiting the transmission through the mail of obscene literature, the Court stated, we do
not expect an individual to be infallible; rather we expect him to not harbor intent to defraud.
45It should seem that the Supreme Court’s understanding of the New York statute undermines any
usefulness of the statute. If the Court interpreted the statute correctly, and it certainly
did according to the simple words of the statute, no one can be prosecuted for a violation
of New York’s kosher food products law as long as he honestly believes that any food labeled
or sold as ‘kosher’ is truly kosher. Prosecution is thus predicated on a perpetrator understanding
the kashrus laws in a certain way and not adhering to his best understanding of the kashrus
laws. While this might appear to mark the end of kashrus litigation, it was just the beginning.
National Foods, Inc. v. Rubin
As recently as 1989, in National Foods, Inc. v. Rubin, 727 F.Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
Hygrade and People v. Atlas were cited as sources declaring the constitutionality of the New
York kosher labeling laws. In National Foods, the plaintiff argued that while the New York
law was constitutional as it was written and as it was applied by the courts, it was applied
in a manner that violated the establishment clause by Rabbi Schulem Rubin, the Director of
the Kosher Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Agriculture and Markets of the State
of New York. National Foods at 109. The court stated, ‘‘Hygrade emphasizes that a good faith
effort to follow a standard religious practice does not violate the statute.’’ Id. at 109.
Hebrew National (National Foods) argued that the New York law is only constitutional if the
statute is construed to mean that state officials cannot impose their own definitions of ‘‘kosher.’’
Hebrew National continued by arguing that because it hires rabbis to supervise all of its meat
processing and a supervising rabbi certified that all of its meat was kosher, that certification
is conclusive evidence of compliance with the statute. When Rabbi Rubin charged Hebrew National
46with a violation, Hebrew National claims he must have applied his own theological standard.
They argued that this was unconstitutional. Because the amended complaint didn’t include any
facts suggesting a theological dispute or the enforcement of one form of religious orthodoxy
over another, the court ruled that the complaint did not state a claim of violation of the
establishment clause. The National Foods case, though, did bring the establishment clause
into play for future cases. In fact, in the year 2000, Rabbi Schulem Rubin again found himself
in court, this time defending New York’s kosher laws against an establishment clause claim.
Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin
In Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F.Supp.2d 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the
plaintiffs were the proprietors of a butcher shop in Commack, Long Island. While the plaintiffs
described themselves as ‘‘Jewish,’’ but ‘‘but not observant in accordance with the tents of
Orthodox Judaism,’’ they also stated at all times the store had ‘‘kosher supervision under
the auspices of a duly ordained rabbi of the Jewish faith.’’ Plaintiffs claimed, as well,
that they never made any representation that they sold food koshered ‘‘in accordance with orthodox
Hebrew requirements;’’ they say, instead, that they marketed their food as ‘‘kosher.’’ Thus,
if the statute wasn’t premised on one’s compliance with strictly orthodox strictures, then
the plaintiffs committed no violation. Why then did Rabbi Rubin cite them several times? Rabbi
Rubin must have executed his supervisory duties based on compliance with the orthodox Hebrew
requirements, as opposed to the honest belief that one is keeping kosher. Indeed, in its decision,
the court stated that the relevant statutory provisions were interpreted for decades as equating
‘‘kosher’’ with ‘‘orthodox Hebrew religious requirements.’’ The court cited cases such as
47State v. Glassman, 441 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1981)(‘‘The issue in this case is whether
the defendants ‘with intent to defraud’ represented that their frank furthers and salami were
Kosher when in fact [they were not because the were] not prepared in accordance with the Orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements.’’), and People v. Johnson Kosher Meat Products, Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d
429 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct. 1964)(‘‘Upon failure at the trial to adduce any evidence that the meat
sold as kosher was not prepared wholly in accordance with Hebrew orthodox religious requirements,
the charges of fraudulent misrepresentation under Section 201-a were dismissed.’’). This interpretation
of the New York statute was so accepted that it was recognized by other states in Erlich v. Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District,
55 Cal.2d 553, 557-558 (Cal. 1961), and in Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 129 N.J.
141 (N.J. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 952 (1993). In Ran-Dav’s, former Attorney General of
New York Robert Abrams filed an amicus brief wherein he wrote that the New York Kosher Laws
‘‘define kosher in terms of orthodox Jewish requirements.’’
Rabbi Rubin argued on behalf of the laws that the laws speak in the disjunctive, in that they
refer to products represented as ‘‘kosher or [italics added] prepared in accordance with orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements.’’ Rabbi Rubin claimed that he did not enforce the law according
to any particular religious standard because the statute makes clear that there is not a consensus
regarding what constitutes kosher food. Commack Self-Service Meats at 452. The court, though,
rejected this argument because ‘‘state courts have explicitly and continuously construed the
word ‘kosher’ in the Challenged Laws to mean ‘products prepared in accordance with orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements.’’’
48Before turning to the establishment clause it is important to point out that the court distinguished
Hygrade. The court stated that it could declare the laws unconstitutional and still accord
with Hygrade because Hygrade did not include a challenge based on the establishment clause;
rather Hygrade was a challenge based on the due process, equal protection, and commerce clauses.
The court also distinguished the result in National Foods by explaining that the establishment
clause claim was only rejected in that case as it applied to the plaintiff, because of a deficiency
in the complaint.
Lemon v. Kurtzman
Before the Commack case existed, other courts had already invalidated statutes similar to the
challenged New York laws. The kosher fraud laws of New Jersey and of Baltimore, Marland were
invalidated under the establishment clause as violating both the effect and excessive entanglement
prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon requires a challenged law (1) to
have a secular purpose, (2) to have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and (3) not to foster excessive state entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13. The Commack
court went on to quote language from Lemon that stated ‘‘the three main evils against which
the establishment clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’’’ Lemon at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). The court states that the challenged New York laws violated all
three of these prohibitions.
The court added that the ‘‘good faith’’ defense, arising out of the requirement of intent to
defraud, doesn’t prevent the establishment clause violation. The court stated:
49An identical argument was rejected in Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control,
66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995), in the following language:
‘‘Whether prosecution under the ordinance focuses on the
subjective intent of the vendor, or the vendor’s compliance
with the Orthodox standards of kashrut, the ordinance
still fosters excessive entanglement between city officials
and leaders of the Orthodox faith with each and every
prosecution.’’ 66 F.3d at 1344. The same is true here,
where daily enforcement of the Challenged Laws requires
state officials to determine the content of religious law.
Moreover, under the Challenged Laws, a vendor who believes
in good faith that its products are kosher under a standard
other than the orthodox standard cannot avail itself of
a good faith defense because, given the statutory meaning
of kosher, as authoritatively established by the New York
courts, that defense requires vendors to claim that they
had a good faith belief that their products were kosher in
accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements.
Commack Self-Service at 456. The essential arguments that swayed the court to invalidate the
statute, as laid out above, seem to make sense. In a further effort to distinguish possible
contradictory holdings, though, the court essentially admitted, albeit unknowingly, that there
is some inconsistency in the law. This inconsistency results from the constant tug-of-war
between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. This contradiction is only
exacerbated by the fact that the conflicting cases all involve kashrus law.
Turner v. Safley
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled, in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), that
prisoners have constitutional rights even while incarcerated. In Turner, which struck down
a prison system’s regulation banning inmate marriages, the Court laid out a four-part test
to determine whether or not a particular inmate must be afforded specific rights in each individual
case. The following are the factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of prison regulations:
50(1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, (3) the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation
of prison resources generally, and (4) the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation. Turner at 89-91. Based on this test, various courts
have ruled that government prisons must provide inmates with kosher meals. Beerheide v. Suthers,
2002 WL 535836 (C.A.10 2002); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (C.A.9 1993); Kahane v. Carlson,
527 F.2d 492 (C.A.2 1975). Of course, this is based on freedom of religion.
While one would think that going out of the way to provide inmates with kosher food should
be an excessive entanglement that primarily advances the Jewish religion, the court went out
of its way to distinguish one of the prison cases. The court in Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d
316, (C.A.2 1999), reversed a grant of summary judgment to defendant prison officials who had
denied an inmate a kosher diet in reliance on the prison chaplain’s determination that the
inmate did not meet his definition of a Jew as ‘‘one who was born Jewish or has formally converted.’’
Rejecting an establishment clause claim on the ground that the issue was ‘‘more properly anchored
in the free exercise clause,’’ the court held that ‘‘whether Jackson’s beliefs are entitled
to free exercise protection turns on whether they are ‘sincerely held,’ not on the ‘ecclesiastical
question’ whether he is in fact a Jew under Judaic law.’’ 196 F.3d at 321.135
The Commack court further distinguished the prison cases by pointing out that providing kosher
135This argument, though, has a weakness. Because the state does not want to entangle itself with religion, it determines who
is a Jew based on whether the relevant individual’s belief that he is a Jew is “sincerely held.” From a Jewish law perspective,
this is a crucial error. One is factually, whether you want to call it a religious fact or a secular fact, not a Jew unless he is born
to a Jewish mother or he properly converts. The state’s attempt to investigate one’s religious status (which really is a factual
status like any other) is correctly analogized to an attempt to determine whether an individual is poor for income tax purposes
based on whether or not his belief that he is poor is “sincerely held.” An individual who tried to ﬂeece the IRS out of money
claiming that he sincerely believes that he is in the lowest tax bracket will certainly end up in jail. So, too, the government
should not attempt to determine who is a Jew in an illegitimate, secular manner.
51food in prisons does not create excessive entanglement simply because it uses a word of religious
significance. The unconstitutional kashrus laws of New York fostered excessive entanglement
and advanced religion because they demanded that the state assume ongoing obligations of enforcement
of purely religious laws, inevitably requiring the state to rely on religious authority and
interpretation to properly enforce them. This is in contrast to the prison cases in which
the state only needs to determine who qualifies for the kosher food. I believe, though, that
the issue is not so easily resolved. If the state is providing kosher food in prisons, it
must be performing many actions to ensure the kashrus of the food. While these actions and
expenditures might be considered de minimis in relation to the Turner four-part test, there
is no denying that the government is nevertheless advancing the Jewish inmate’s religious observance.
Clearly, the state (and really all of the states) has chosen a certain point at which to draw
the line between free exercise and the establishment clause.
Conclusion
I believe that whenever lines are drawn, they are drawn somewhat arbitrarily. Therefore, it
is safe to say that we have not yet heard the last word from the courts on kashrus issues.
By the same token, I am not sure that we have heard the last word from those courts that refuse
to enforce penalties relating to fraudulent use of the word ‘‘kosher.’’ Of course, though,
I am not suggesting that the FDA will ever involve itself with kashrus regulation. It is surely
a stretch to claim that the damage, whether physical or spiritual, that results from a Jew
eating non-kosher food products will be recognized as a health risk that must be protected
by the FDA.
52